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OF TEAMSTERS v. DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT, ANOTHER VICTIM 
OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Western Conference of Teamsters v. Department of Transportation 1 
the Ninth Circuit held that regulations mandating various 
forms of drug testing, enacted by the Federal Highway 
Administration of the Department ofTransportation2 (FHWA), 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.3 The court also held that the decision to promul-
gate the regulations was not arbitrary or capricious.' The court 
found that compelling governmental interests in safety and 
deterrence6, balanced against the commercial drivers' limited pri-
vacy expectations/rendered the FHWA's regulations constitu-
tional on their face. 7 
1. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, W. Conference of Teamsters v. 
Department of Transp.j Amalgamated Transit Union v. Department of Transp.j 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, United Transp. Union v. Department of Transp.j 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees v. 
Department of Transp.j The Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union (·OCA WIU"), 
and Locals 1-219, 1-128, and 1-5 v. Department ofTransp., Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 
932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Tang, J.j the other panel members were Skopil, J. 
and Fletcher, J.). . 
2. The Federal Highway Administration of the Department of Transportation 
[hereinafter FHW AJ. 
3. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1306-1308. (See infra note 19 for 
text of Fourth Amendment.). 
4. Id. at 1308-09. 
5. Id. at 1303·04. 
6. Id. at 1300-02. 
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II. FACTS 
On June 14, 1988, the FHWA proposed that certain com-
mercial drivers be tested for the use of controlled substances.8 
The FHWA conducted public hearings and received comments 
concerning the proposed drug testing program.9 On November 
21, 1988, the FHWA published its drug testing regulations.10 
The purpose of the regulations was "to detect and deter the use 
of drugs by bus and truck drivers."l1 All interstate motor car-
riers were to implement drug testing programs.12 
The FHWA used the Department of Transportation's pro-
cedures for conducting drug tests. IS Under this scheme, posi-
tive drug test results would be reported first to the employer's 
designated Medical Review Officer (MRO),14 who would then 
report the test results to the employer. 16 
The Unions18 brought actions to challenge the FHWA reg-
ulations on their face rather than as applied. They attacked the 
8. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1294. The proposed rule making 
was codified at 53 Fed. Reg. 22,268 (1988). 
9. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F .2d at 1294. The FHWA conceded that 
data was scarce setting out drug use of commercial drivers in regard to highway acci-
dents. The FHWA attributed this to commercial drivers working without supervision. 
The extent of the problem was left undetermined. Id. 
10. The regulations were codified at 49 C.F.R. § 391.81-391.123 (1989). The 
FHWAjustified the promulgation of the drug testing regulations due to the perva-
siveness of drug abuse in society. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1295. 
11. 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,135. 
12. The regulations require "all interstate motor carriers to implement drug test-
ing programs for drivers operating vehicles (i) weighing more than 26,000 pounds, (ii) 
carrying fifteen or more passengers, or (iii) transporting hazardous materials." 49 
C.F.R. § 391.85. The carriers must test all employee drivers and all contract drivers 
who are under contract with them for ninety or more days a year. Id. 
13. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.1-40.41. The drug testing urine collection site must be prop-
erly secured and private. 49 C.F.R. § 40.25(e). Direct observation of the urination is 
allowed only when the monitor may reasonably suspect the integrity of the specimen. 
Id. An immunoassay test is initially performed if there is a positive reading; then it 
is confirmed through a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry technique. 49 C.F.R. 
§ 40.29(e)-<O. 
14. 49 C.F.R. § 40.33(a). The MRO must be a licensed physician with knowledge 
of substance abuse disorders. 49 C.F.R. § 40.33(b). 
15. The MRO investigates alternative explanations for the positive result and 
must provide the employee an opportunity to explain the result. 49 C.F.R. § 40.33(b)-
(c). If the positive result is due to legitimate medical treatment or is scientifically insuf-
ficient or unreliable, the test result shall be reported as negative to the employer. 49 
C.F.R. § 40.33(0. 
16. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Railway Labor Executives' Association, and Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers (col-
lectively, "the Unions"). 
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validity of random, biennial, pre-employment, and post-acci-
dent testing schemes.17 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the FHWA's 
regulations to decide whether the drug tests can ever be con-
ducted without offending the fourth amendment. IS 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The fourth amendment'sl9 main function is "to protect 
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion 
by the state. "20 The fourth amendment does not apply to 
search or seizure effected by a private party on his own, but 
if the private party acted as an agent or instrument ofthe gov-
ernment the fourth amendment does apply.21 Drug testing 
17. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1295. The regulations institute 
drug testing in six instances: 1) random testing, 49 C.F.R. § 391.109; 2) biennial testing 
(employers may cease biennial testing once they have fully implemented their random 
drug testing programs), 49 C.F.R. § 391.105; 3) pre-employment drug tests (limited to 
driver applicants whom the carrier intends to hire), 49 C.F.R. § 391.103; 
4) reportable accidents (An accident is -reportable ifit involves (a) a fatality, (b) an injury 
demanding immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the accident, or (c) at 
least $4,400 in property damage"), 49 C.F.R. § 391.113; 5) -When the employer has cause 
to believe that a driver is using a controlled substance." (conduct giving rise to "the rea-
sonable suspicion must have been witnessed by at least one supervisor trained in the 
detection of probable drug use."), 49 C.F.R. § 391.99; 6) follow-up testing for drivers who 
tested positive for drug use, C.F.R. § 391.123. The Unions did not challenge the fifth and 
sixth testing schemes. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1295. 
Id. 
18. Id. at 1298. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
20. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). Schmerber was convict-
ed of driving under the influence while intoxicated by liquor. The U.S. Supreme 
court held that blood taken at Schmerber's objection by a physician in a hospital after 
he was arrested did not violate Schmerber's Fourth Amendment right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 772. 
21. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984). Defendants 
were convicted of possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute. Federal 
agents were informed by the employees of a private freight carrier that they had 
observed a white powdery substance in a damaged package. Id. at 111. These employ-
ees had independently opened the package to examine the contents, cut open the pack-
age and found plastic bags containing white powder. Id. The court stated that the fourth 
amendment only protected against governmental action. Id. at 113. It is not applicable 
to a search or seizure made by a private citizen unless acting as an agent of the gov-
ernment or with the participation or knowledge of the government. Id. 
3
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performed by private parties under compulsion of sovereign 
authority or government regulations is also controlled by 
the fourth amendment.22 
B. DRUG TESTING & SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The extraction of blood from the human body to be analyzed 
for alcohol content was first deemed a fourth amendment 
search in Schmerber v. California. 23 While urine testing does 
not involve surgical intrusion into the body,24 the Federal 
Courts of Appeals have unanimously agreed that urine testing 
must be deemed a search under the fourth amendment.26 A 
urine test may also be a fourth amendment seizure since it may 
be a meaningful interference with the employee's possessory 
interest in his bodily fluids. 26 
When special governmental needs beyond normal law 
enforcement are served through a fourth amendment intrusion 
it becomes necessary to balance individual privacy expectations 
against governmental interests to determine if a warrant or 
some level of individualized suspicion should be required in the 
particular context.27 A search generally must be supported by 
a warrant issued upon probable cause. 26 The warrant 
22. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The 
U.S. Supreme Court held constitutional under the fourth amendment a Federal 
Administration program that (1) required railroads to administer blood and urine tests 
to train employees involved in major accidents, and (2) allowed railroads to conduct 
breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety regulations. [d. at 633. 
"[cHear indices of ... Government encouragement, endorsement, and participation 
... suffice to implicate the fourth amendment." [d. at 615-16. 
23. 384 U.S. at 767-68 (see infra note 20 for facts of this case.) "The administration 
of a blood test ... plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.· [d. 
24. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. "The chemical analysis of urine, like ... blood, can 
reveal ... private medical facts about an employee ... " [d. 
25. [d. See Railway Labor Executives Assoc. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (held regulations mandating blood and urine tests of employees after cer-
tain train accidents, fatal incidents, and rule violations without requiring individu-
alized suspicion violated employees' fourth amendment rights). 
26. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. (See infra note 21 for discussion of this case.) 
See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618, "[nJot every governmental interference with an indi-
vidual's freedom of movement raises such constitutional concerns that there is a 
seizure of the person." [d. 
27. ld. at 617-18. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
Griffin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon while on probation. [d. at 
870. His home was searched by probation officers without a warrant. [d. During this 
search the officers found a gun. [d. The court usually requires a search be pursuant 
to a warrant and thus supported by probable cause.ld. at 873. The court, however, 
4
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requirement protects citizens' privacy interests by assuring 
them that they will not be subject to searches or seizures that 
are random or arbitrary acts of the government or its agents. 29 
However, if there is a special need, a warrant or probable 
cause may not be required.80 
The Government has a strong interest in dispensing with 
the warrant requirement when the burden in obtaining the 
warrant is apt to frustrate the governmental purpose for the 
search.81 A delay in obtaining a warrant may result in the 
destruction of evidence.82 A warrant does not provide addi-
tional protection of personal privacy.88 Skinner noted that a war-
rant was not essential to render drug and alcohol test 
intrusions reasonable under the fourth amendment.M 
Even in circumstances where it is reasonable to dispense 
with the warrant requirement, there must be probable cause 
for the search.86 However, the usual requirements of a warrant 
and probable cause86 do not necessarily apply to drug testing.37 
has made exceptions when special needs make the warrant and probable cause 
requirement impracticable. Id. The special needs must be beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement. Id. The state's operation of a probation system presents special needs 
beyond law enforcement that justifies a departure from the probable cause and war-
rant requirements. Id. 
29. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-622. 
30. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Custom Service's drug-testing program was sub-
ject to the fourth amendment and that it was not necessary for the Custom Service to 
obtain warrants to conduct drug testing. Id. 
31. Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). Camera refused sev-
eral times to allow the San Francisco'Department of Public Health to inspect his 
premises because they lacked a search warrant. Id. at 526-27. Camera was arrested 
for violating a San Francisco housing code by refusing to allow the warrantless 
inspection of his residence. Id. at 527. The court held that administrative searches of 
this kind were significant intrusions on the interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment, when conducted without a warrant. Id. at 534. 
32. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 623. 
33. Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 667 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 
383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring». "[Because there is not] a discretionary determi-
nation to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present, there are 
simply no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate." Id. 
34. Skinner. 489 U.S. at 624. 
35.Id. 
S6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
37. Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, U.S. , 
111 S. Ct. 954 (1991). The Federal Aviation Administration required random drug 
testing of private airline employees. Id. at 453. Employees included under the 
regulations were flight crew members, maintenance workers, air traffic controllers and 
various other categories of employees. Id. The testing was designed to deter drug use 
and to prevent performance by employees under the influence of narcotics. Id. at 455. 
"lilt is clear that the ... drug testing requirements serve special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement .... " Id. The court held that the random drug 
5
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If a court concludes that a testing program invades rea-
sonable expectations of privacy and that the tests are motivated 
by special needs other than law enforcement, the court must 
balance the private and governmental interests to determine 
if the testing is justified.88 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1245 
v. Skinner89 established a two-prong test to determine whether 
an intrusion exists on an individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The first inquiry is whether employees in a particular 
industry already have a diminished expectation of privacy due 
to other circumstances related to their jobs. 40 The second inquiry 
looks to the steps taken within the testing program to minimize 
further intrusion into the employees' privacy. 41 
Employees who participate in industries that are regulat-
ed to ensure safety, health and fitness have a diminished 
expectation ofprivacy,42 Drug testing poses a limited threat to 
regulated employees' privacy expectations.48 
The government has a compelling interest in testing employ-
ees in these industries." Employees who are subject to testing 
could cause severe injury to others even during a momentary 
lapse of attention. 46 Testing is also important because employ-
ees who are impaired often do not show outward signs.48 Where 
testing of airline employees who held safety-sensitive positions did not violate the 
employees' fourth amendment rights. Id. at 457. See also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666. 
38. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455-456. 
39. 913 F.2d 1454 (1990). 
40. Id. at 1463. 
41. Id. 
42. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627. See The Hours of Service Act (1907), where the rela-
tionship between safety and employee fitness was recognized by Congress. 
43. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. ("[dliminished expectation of privacy attaches to 
information relating to the physical condition of covered [by regulation) employees and 
to ... reasonable means of procuring such information.· Id.) 
44. Id. The government's compelling interests in testing are not an undue 
infringement on the employees' privacy expectation and outweighs the employees' pri-
vacy concerns. Id. at 633. See alBo Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n. 3. "It is sufficient that 
the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive soci-
etal problem from spreading to the particular context.· Id. 
45. Skinner. 489 F.2d at 628. "An idle locomotive, sitting in the roadhouse, is 
harmless. It becomes lethal when operated negligently by persons who are under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs." Id. 
46. Id. Supervisors are not trained to detect outward signs that are not detectable 
by lay persons or in many cases physicians. Id. "Employees ... can cause great human loss 
before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others." Id. See also 
Von Raab 489 U.S. at 674. "Detecting drug impairment on the part of employees can be 
a difficult task, especially where ... it is not feasible to subject employees ... to day to day 
scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments.· Id. 
6
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the harm the Government seeks to guard against is substan-
tial, prevention furnishes an adequate justification for rea-
sonable searches in furtherance of the governmental goals.47 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
The Ninth Circuit balanced the drivers' privacy expectations 
against the government's interest to determine whether a 
warrant is required by the Constitution.48 The FHWA imple-
mented the drug testing schemes to promote public safety 
and to deter drug use by bus and truck drivers.49 The Ninth 
Circuit found no need for a warrant because of the standard-
ized nature of the tests and the administrators' minimal dis-
cretion in the selection of which employees to test. 5O Thus, the 
fourth amendment does not mandate that motor carriers 
obtain a warrant prior to administration of the drug tests 
ordered by the FHWA.61 
B. RANDOM DRUG TESTING 
The Ninth Circuit inquired into the decrease in privacy 
caused by the search,52 relative to the driver's privacy 
47. Id. at 674-75. 
48. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 
1299 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Where a fourth amendment intrusion serves special gov-
ernmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy 
expectations against the Government's interests to determine 
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level 
of individualized suspicion in the particular context. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. 
49. 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,135. 
50. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1299. The regulations define how 
the tests are to be administrated and also specify how drivers are to be selected for 
testing. Id. "With respect to pre-employment, post-accident, and biennial drug test-
ing, the drivers are selected by objectively discernible triggering events (a job appli-
cation, accident, and passage of a preestablished period of time, respectively)." Id. 
51. Id. at 1300. Previous decisions concerning drug- testing hold that the weight 
is against a warrant requirement. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 
489 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1989); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (1990). See 
infra notes 22 and 37 for facts and accompanying discussion of these cases. 
52. The search consisted of the act of urination required to collect the specimen. 
International Bhd of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1300. 
7
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expectation.53 The privacy expectations of commercial truck 
drivers are markedly less than those of the public in general. 64 
The coUrt noted that commercial drivers operate in a highly reg-
ulated industry. 55 As such these drivers have already submit-
ted to substantial federal monitoring of their physical health 
and qualifications,56 and they currently undergo biennial uri-
nalysis as part of their regular· required physical. 57 
Consequently, the court concluded that the incremental 
decrease in privacy, resulting from collection of a second urine 
specimen for drug-testing, was constitutionally tolerable.58 
The FHWA's primary interests in enacting these regula-
tions were enhanced transportation safety, accident avoidance, 
and deterrence of drug use. 59 The Unions argued that there 
was insufficient evidence of a serious drug problem among com-
mercial drivers, therefore, there was no justification for an 
abridgement of the drivers' fourth amendment rights.5O However, 
the FHWA had a compelling governmental interest in prevent-
ing drivers from using illegal drugs while behind the wheel, 
showing a concern for safety and deterrence, thus leading to the 
implementation of random drug testing on commercial drivers.61 
The FHWA had a compelling governmental interest in 
instituting the drug-testing scheme, and there is only an incre-
mental intrusion on the commercial drivers' privacy expecta-
tion.62 Random drug testing of commercial drivers does not 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 regulates the physical condition of drivers. See 
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 612·13 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990) (privacy expectations of security guards were 
reduced because of extensive medical examinations they were already subjected to); 
Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113,115 (4th Cir. 1989) (employees at chemical plants 
had reduced privacy expectations because of annual physicals that included urine test· 
ing). 
55. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1300. "Drivers have long been 
subjected to federal regulation".Id. 
56. Id. Regulations regarding the physical condition of the driver are found in 
49 C.F.R. 391.41. 
57. 49 C.F.R. 391.105 See also 49 C.F.R. 391.45. 
58. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1302. 
59. 53 Fed. Reg. at 22,271. 
60. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1304. The Unions also argued 
that the FHWA failed to rely on less intrusive alternatives to drug testing.ld. 
61. Id. There is a vital governmental interest in the sobriety and fitness of 
operators of dangerous instrumentalities or equipment. Id. "While a single accident 
may not imperil as many lives as a single airline or train crash, the vast number of 
drivers on the road at any time multiplies the danger to motorists and raises the 
FHW A's concern for transportation safety to the level of a compelling governmental 
interest." Id. 
62. Id. at 1305. 
8
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offend the fourth amendment despite the lack of a warrant or 
individual suspicion.63 
C. PERIODIC TESTING 
Major carriers must conduct a drug test on all drivers 
during their first medical examination following commence-
ment of the entire drug testing program.64 One year after 
random drug testing has been fully implemented, motor car-
riers may discontinue periodic urinalysis for controlled sub-
stance use. 65 
The court observed that the constitutional analysis applied 
to random drug testing applies equally to periodic testing.66 
Because random testing could miss some drivers, the FHWA 
has a compelling interest in guaranteeing that all drivers are 
tested at least once.67 Blanket testing will better promote 
transportation safety and will further advance deterrence, 
because no driver using or contemplating using drugs will be 
tempted to play the odds in the hope that random testing will 
not target him.68 
The transportation concerns articulated in the FHWA's 
regulations are compelling.69 This outweighs the incremental 
63. Id. at 1306. See Hartness ,v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In 
H.artness the district court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding agencies in the 
Executive Office of the President from conducting random urinalysis drug- testing of 
employees with secret national security clearances. Id. at 171. The court held that the 
random drug testing of employees with secret national security clearances was valid. 
Id. See also Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455 (see infra note 37 for discussion ofthis case.); 
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 889-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1960 (1990). This action was brought by the American 
Federation of Govemment Employees challenging a suspicionless drug testing plan of 
Department of Transportation employees, alleging violations of the fourth amendment. 
Id. at 886. The court held that the employees' privacy interests were outweighed by 
the Department of Transportation's compelling interest in preventing drug abuse among 
employees.Id. at 898. The searches could be conducted without any individualized sus-
picion and were reasonable and consistent with the fourth amendment. Id. 
64. 49 C.F.R. § 391.105(a). "A motor carrier shall require a driver to be tested 
... at least once every two years commencing with the driver's first medical examina-
tion ... after the motor carrier's implementation of a drug testing program." Id. 
"Exception. A motor carrier may use a driver who participates in a drug testing program 
of another motor carrier or controlled substance consortium." 49 C.F .R. § 391.105(b). 
65. Id. at § 391.105(c). Periodic urinalysis may be discontinued if the motor car-
rier tests its drivers at a 50 percent rate. Id. 
66. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1306. "The drivers' privacy objec-
tions have significantly less force in this context." Id. ' 
67. Id. at 1307. 
68. Id. "All will know that all will be tested." Id. 
69. Id. at 1305-06. 
9
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intrusion on the driver's privacy.70 The balance struck in favor 
of random drug testing does not offend the fourth amendment. 71 
D. PRE-EMPLOYMENT TESTING 
Pre-employment testing does not violate the fourth amend-
ment for the same reasons as the previous drug-testing 
schemes.72 The privacy expectations of commercial drivers are 
significantly reduced relative to other members ofsociety.7sThey 
have voluntarily entered a profession which requires physical 
examinations and urinalysis. 74 The intrusion is less than in ran-
dom testing, and there is no element of surprise.76 The test is 
triggered by the job applicant's voluntary conduct and will 
occur only once in the applicant's career with that carrier.76 
Pre-employment testing ensures that drivers who use drugs 
never get behind the wheel. 77 The concern for preempting acci-
dents outweighs the minimal intrusion onjob applicants' pri-
vacy, making the conduct of suspicionless, pre-employment 
testing constitutional.78 
E. POST-AcCIDENT TESTING 
The FHWA's regulations require that drivers arrange to be 
tested for drug use within thirty-two hours of a "reportable 
accident."79 The Unions voiced the same objections here as 
they did in regard to the other testing situations.80 The FHWA 
70. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1305-06. 
71. Id. at 1306. The FHWA's regulations are constitutional on their face.Id. 
72. Id. at 1307. 
73. Id. 
74. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1307. The physical examination 




77. Id. -The FHWA need not wait until a driver is actually working (and thus a 
potential daily hazard) to begin promoting safety and deterrence." Id. -The FHWA's 
decision to require pre· employment testing ... was [basedl, at least in part, by ... 
evidence of high drug use rates among job applicants." Id. at 1307-08 n. 9. 
78. Id. at 1307-08. 
79. 49 C.F.R. § 391. 113(a). An accident is reportable ifit involves (1) a fatality, 
(2) an injury demanding immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the acci· 
dent, or (3) at least $4,400 in property damage. 49 C.F.R. § 394.3. 
80. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1308. These objectives were -the 
intrusion on privacy and the lack of evidence that drug use is a significant factor in 
accidents involving commercial trucks." Id. 
10
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bases for post-accident drug testing regulations are deter-
rence and the need to gather information81 about the causes of 
accidents. 811 The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 
the post-accident drug testing.8S 
II. The Arbitrary and Capricious Claim 
The Ninth Circuit held that the promulgation of these regu-
lations was not arbitrary and capricious.M The FHWA explained 
why it chose to implement these regulations and considered 
how these tests would affect the drivers' privacy.86 The tests 
were designed to maximize the drivers' privacy and confiden-
tiality.86 The FHWA collected evidence documenting the drug 
use problem, and demonstrated efficacy of the various drug tests 
in achieving the goals of deterrence and transportation safety.87 
V. CRITIQUE 
In light of the recent acceptance by the U.S. Supreme 
. Court of drug tests for customs agents88 and railroad 
81. Id. The court did not "expre88 an opinion on whether the government's 
interest in data collection alone would outweigh the intrusion on drivers' privacy in 
this instance." Id. at n. 11. 
82. Id. With the information about the causes of accidents appropriate measures 
can be taken to safeguard the public.Id. See also 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,140-41. 
83. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1308. 
84. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 
1308 (9th Cir. 1991). 
85. Id. "The announced purpose of the testing program was to detect and deter 
the use of drugs by bus and truck drivers." Id. at 1294. The FHWA reasoned that: 
Id. 
Drug testing and sanctions for use will help discourage 
substance use and reduce absenteeism, accidents, health 
care costs; and other drug-related problems. It will act as 
a deterrent to those individuals who might be tempted to 
try drugs for the first time or who currently use drugs. 
Finally, drug testing will protect the health and safety of 
the employees of motor carriers and other users of the 
highway system through the early identification and refer-
ral for treatment of workers with drug use problems. 
86. Id. at 1308. 
87. Id. The evidence collected was both testimonial and empirical. Id. "The 
FHWA conceded from the outset that data documenting actual drug use by commer-
cial drivers and its role in highway accidents were scarce." Id. at 1295. This was 
attributed to commercial drivers working without supervision.Id. "While the FHW A's 
investigation might not have been paradigmatic, it ... was sufficiently reasonable to 
justify its actions." Id. at 1308-09. 
88. See National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) 
(upholding drug testing when individuals sought promotions and transfers). See 
infra note 30 for facts and accompanying discussion of this case. 
11
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workers ,89 the Ninth Circuit's approval of random, pre-employ-
ment, post-accident, and biennial drug testing in International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Department of Transportation is in 
accord with the U.S. Constitution's fourth amendment search 
and seizure element and within the mainstream of judicial 
reasoning. 90 The finding in International Bhd. of Teamsters is 
also consistent with previous Ninth Circuit decisions. 91 
Nevertheless, the allowance of drug testing of commercial 
drivers is an extension of the erosion of an individual's fourth 
amendment privacy rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure by the current Supreme Court.92 "Constitutional prin-
ciples, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed."93 
The Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court have focused 
on the safety interests promoted by drug testing.94 Traditionally, 
public health and safety concerns have been considered the 
highest level of public interest considerations.96 However, this 
89. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assco., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (uphold-
ing post accident tests for railroad workers). See infra note 22 for facts and accom-
panying discussion of this case. 
90. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, W. Conference of Teamsters v. 
Department of Transp.; Amalgamated Transit Union v. Department of Transp.; 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, United Transp. Union v. Department of Transp.; 
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees v. 
Department ofTransp.; The Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union ("OCA WIU"), 
and Locals 1-219, 1-128, and 1-5 v. Department ofTransp., Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 
932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991). 
91. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Assoc. v. Skinner, 934 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 
1991)(holding Federal Railroad Administration's random drug testing regulations did 
not infringe on railroad employees' privacy interest, thus constitutional); International 
Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1990)(holding 
Department of Transportation drug testing of employees engaged in natural gas, liq-
uefied natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline operations constitutional); Bluestein 
v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 954, 112 
(1991)(holding Federal Aviation Administration regulations requiring random drug 
testing oftlight crew members, maintenance personnel, air traffic controllers, and sev-
eral other categories of employees in the private commercial aviation industry does 
not violate the fourth amendment). 
92. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)(Marshall, dissenting) The majority in the 
Ninth Circuit has been" ... swept away by society's obsession with stopping the scrouge 
of illegal drugs ... [the decisions in International Bhd. of Teamsters and by the cur-
rent Supreme Court] ... will reduce the privacy all citizens may enjoy." Id. 
93. Hartness, 919 F.2d at 175 (Edwards, dissenting). 
94. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d 1292; International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 913 F.2d 
1454; Bluestein, 908 F.2d 451. 
95. Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1124 (3rd Cir. 1988). The unions challenged proposed 
random and return-to-work urinalysis drug and alcohol testing by the public 
transportation authority. Id. at 1112. The court concluded that random drug testing was 
12
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focus is at the expense of individuals' fourth amendment 
rights. The Department of Transportation's drug testing reg-
ulations for commercial drivers is far broader and more intru-
sive than the testing upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Skinner and Von Raab. 96 In both Skinner and Von Raab the test-
ing occurred only at one time, when it was prompted by specific 
events.97 In International Bhd. of Teamsters there is recur-
ring intrusive testing.98 Even though the commercial drivers are 
subject to comprehensive biennial medical examinations that 
include urinalysis,99 the biennial medical examination does 
not justify drug testing that is a further intrusion of individ-
ual rights. The medical examination's purpose is not to test for 
drug use,l00 therefore, the commercial driver suffers more than 
a minimal privacy intrusion. 
Even if there is availability of notice before the drug test-
ing, it is not sufficient to justify a suspicionless search under 
the fourth amendment. 101 In reality, there is no notice for ran-
dom or post-accident testing even though there is notifica-
tion by the regulation itself that random and post-accident 
testing will occur. The commercial driver does not know when 
random testing or an accident will occur. For pre-employment 
and biennial testing there may be notice by the consensual 
aspect of applying for employment, since there is notice that 
an applicant may be subject to drug testing. 
The court has balanced the public interest in safety and the 
government's interest in drug-free commercial drivers against 
an individual's privacy rights, trying to justify all types of 
drug testing. It appears that the court's ruling may lead to 
valid under the fourth amendment, but there was no reasonableness to the return-to-
work drug testing. Id. at 1113. Thus, there are some public interests that justify more 
than a minimal privacy intrusion. Id. at 1124. 
96. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 
97. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656. 
98. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1295. 
99. Id. at 1300. Urinalysis to detect infections of the genito-urinary tract, history 
ofluetic infection or latent syphilis is included in these examinations. Id. The purpose 
of these examinations is to detect physical, mental, or organic defects that would affect 
the driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. Id. at 1301 n. 5. 
100. Id. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 649. 
101. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637,641,650 (Marshall, dissenting) "Constitutional 
requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present when advan-
tageous, conveniently absent when special needs make them seem not." Id. at 637. 
"There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism 
exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest." Id. 
at 641. "The benefits of suspicionless blood and urine testing are far outstripped by 
the costs imposed on personal liberty by such sweeping searches." Id. at 650. 
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future decisions affecting every employee in every profession 
and employment. lOll Soon most employees may be subject to drug 
testing. l03 Hopefully the ruling in International Bhd. of 
Teamsters is limited to the testing of workers in sensitive or 
safety related jobs, which the courts' decisions indicate. 
What is sufficient to be a government compelling interest 
to justify drug testing? There probably are sufficient govern-
mental interests to mandate drug testing when there are 
statistics available to prove a drug problem in a particular 
industry and when public safety is at risk. The court's decision, 
however, does not state that when there is proof of a drug 
problem in an industry, there will be less scrutiny of the drug 
testing regulations. lo. When there is not statistical proof of a 
drug problem, the courts should scrutinize the drug testing reg-
ulations more closely to determine whether a compelling gov-
ernment interest in public safety justifies the erosion of civil 
liberties and the protection guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment. There should be concern regarding the degree that indi-
vidual rights and liberties are falling victim to the government's 
war on drugs. l06 In Hartness there was no evidence of a drug 
problem in employees with secret national security clear-
ances, 106 just as there was no eVIdence of a drug problem in com-
mercial drivers in International Bhd. of Teamsters. 107 The court 
in Von Raab rationalized the lack of evidence with the response 
that the workplace is not immune from the social problem of 
drug abuse. lOB If this type of generalization justifies searches 
without suspicion, then the fourth amendment has limited 
102. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 685 (Scalia, dissenting). "[i]fthose who carry guns 
can be [exposed to needless indignity], ... so can all others whose work, if performed 
under the influence of drugs, may endanger others, automobile drivers, operators of 
potentially dangerous equipment, construction workers, school crossing guards." Id. 
103. See Hass, The Supreme Court Enters the -Jar Wars-: Drug Testing, Public 
Employees, and the Fourth Amendment, 94 DICK. L. REV. 305, 306 n. 6, 8 (1990). 
"Approximately 50% of the Fortune 500 companies have implemented some form of 
drug testing." Id. "[t]he controversy over drug testing also extends to efforts to test col-
lege, professional and amateur athletes, prisoners, pre-trial detainees, probationers, 
parolees, and others who are not employees." Id. 
104. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d 1292. 
105. Hartness, 919 F.2d at 174 (Edwards, dissenting). See also Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
at 687 (Scalia, dissenting). "[t]he impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means 
of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abo-
lition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search." Id. 
106. Hartness, 919 F.2d at 175 (Edwards, dissenting). See infra note 63 for dis-
cussion of this case. 
107. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1295. 
108. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684. 
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protection. lOS The fourth amendment is a constitutional com-
mand, not merely a discretionary doctrine to be waived for good 
cause. no The recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit and the 
U.S. Supreme Court seem to reshape the fourth amendment to 
accommodate the current drug problem. 111 
There also are the issues of the expense and practicality of 
the drug tests. There is the possibility of excessive costs 
involved in the testing, depending on the procedure. There also 
is the possible loss of productivity and morale among those to 
be tested. 112 These concerns, however, should be weighed against 
the value of human life, injury, property saved and the deter-
rent effect. Drug testing may also provide more accurate data 
for accident reports, have an effect on the insurance industry 
costs, and the costs of transportation and shipping. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Department 
of Transportation, 113 the Ninth Circuit upheld the Department 
of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration's regu-
lations mandating six forms of drug testing of commercial 
truck and bus drivers. This was held despite the argument that 
such testing violated the individual's constitutional right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth 
amendment. 114 This case appears to open the way for the future 
erosion of fourth amendment protection in other occupations 
and professions and in other aspects of individuals' lives. 
Judith S. Rosen* 
109. See Hartness, 919 F.2d at 175 (Edwards, dissenting). 
110. Hartness, 919 F.2d at 174 (Edwards, dissenting). "[t]hejudiciary is ... with-
out authority to trim back the fourth amendment." [d. 
111. [d. at 175. See also Von Raab 498 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, dissenting). The pri-
mary intention is to demonstrate the government's determination to win its war on 
drugs. It is "[o]bvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of 
individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism, even sym-
bolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an oth-
erwise unreasonable search." [d. 
112. See Hass, 94 DICK. L. REV. at 368. "[m]any constitutionally unencumbered 
private employers may have been hesitant to implement drug testing, with the atten-
dant risks of employee resentment and union opposition." [d. 
113. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
114. [d. at 1294. 
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